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cedure4S when it stated: "If an administrative agency is best qualified to weigh
the facts and opinions that culminate in regulations, its conclusions should be
final and it is no anomaly that they are; [but] the legality of applyinga regulation to a particular party may still be questioned, and the relevant facts shown,
in the usual types of judicial proceedings ....

If a party has no standing what-

ever, in certain circumstances, to challenge the administrative action, the reason
is that under the governing substantive law the action taken is not an infringe6
ment of any legal interest of that party."4
The opinion in the Philadelphiacase did not make the court's position clear
as to whether the decision rested upon the belief that rules and regulations can
be reviewed under Section 24(a) or upon the belief that the amendment in
question was an order. If the former is the court's belief, that belief seems clearly
to conflict with the language of the statute providing that orders are reviewable,
without making any mention of regulations. If the court's belief is that the
amendment to Rule U-49 (c) was an order, that determination cannot be said
to be clearly wrong because the definitions and distinctions in this field are not
sufficiently precise to enable one to be certain of any result. However, it is submitted that the court's opinion did not shed light upon the confused and complex considerations with which it was dealing. The court made no effort to
clarify the status of an administrative regulation under Section 24(a) of the
Public Utilities Holding Company Act. It did not indicate a test for determining
when there is an order that is reviewable under that section.
It is submitted that a desirable policy would be to deny reviewability of administrative regulations under Section 24(a). Judicial review of the legality of
applying the'regulations to a party should be allowed to such party only if he
can show that application of the regulation will injure him. There should be no
exceptions to this policy. But if a party can show that mere promulgation of a
regulation causes him injury, he should have standing in a court of equity to
obtain immediate review. This latter situation is demonstrated in the Columbia
case. Presumably there would be very few regulations which would give rise to
review prior to application of the regulation to specific parties.
In the Philadelphiacase there was no certainty that the complaining company was going to be injured. If such injury becomes apparent when the amendment is enforced, the company will then have its opportunity for a day in court.
The decision under discussion was not necessary to protect its rights.
ILLEGALITY PER SE OF PARTIAL EXCLUSION
FROM MARKET
The appellant, International Salt Company, owr~ed patents on two machines
for utilizing salt products in various industrial processes. It distributed these
4s A committee appointed by the Attorney General, at the request of the President, to investigate the need for procedural reform in various administrative tribunals and to suggest
improvements therein.
46Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies: Report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure, 77 th Cong. 1st Sess., at rig (1941).
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machines under leases requiring the lessees to purchase from the International
Salt Company all salt and salt tablets used in the machines. The United States
brought a civil anti-trust action to enjoin the appellant from carrying out the
provisions of these tying clauses, alleging that the restriction violated Section i
of the Sherman Act, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.2 The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, stating that no issue
as to material facts was presented.3 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the
alternate decree proposed by the appellant4 and affirmed the decree of the district court invalidating the tying clauses and directing the appellant to offer to
sell, lease, or license the patented machines to any applicant on non-discriminatory terms.5 InternationalSalt Co. v. United States.6
The Salt Company argued that the summary judgment was unwarranted
since there was no trial of the factual issue of the reasonableness of the restraint
under the Sherman Act, or of the lessening of competition, or of the tendency to
create a monopoly under the Clayton Act. The Court rejected this contention,
stating that it was unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any substantial part of the market.7 Moreover, the contracts in question were not saved
from unreasonableness because the lessees were given the privilege of buying
salt of an equal grade in the open market if the defendant would not furnish salt
at the market price. "The appellant had at all times a priority on the business
at equal prices. A competitor would have to undercut appellant's price to have
' 26

Stat.

209

(1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (i941).

238 Stat. 731 (1914), I5U S.C.A. § 14 (X941).

3United States v. International Salt Co., 6 F.R.D. 302 (N.Y., 1946).
4The defendant would be enjoined "from refusing to sell, lease or license the use of any
such machine to any person ...or from discriminating in the terms of any contract of sale,
lease, or license ...with any person.., on the ground that he has used or dealt in, or intends
to use or deal in, salt not manufactured or sold by the defendant International Salt." International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 S. Ct. 12, at 16 n. 8 (i947).
s "Defendant... is directed to offer ...the use of the ... machines... to any applicant
on non-discriminatory terms and conditions; provided that... the rental or sale price or
royalty at any one time is uniform as to each size or type of machine." Ibid., at i6 n. 7.
6 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947), noted in 46 Mich. L. Rev. 576 (1948).

7The Supreme Court in the instant case cited Fashion Originators Guild of America v.
FTC, i14 F. 2d 8o,85 (C.C.A. 2d, 194o), aff'd 312 U.S. 457 (1941), as authority for this proposition, but went on to add that the volume of business cannot be said to be insignificant and
that under "the law, agreements are forbidden which 'tend to create a monopoly,' and it is
immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop...

."

International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 S.Ct.

12,

I5 (1947).Thus it would seem

that the general proposition that it is unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors must be
limited in that the question of unreasonableness depends upon the degree of control over the
industry which is exercised by the defendant. The district court explained that in the light of
FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), and Pick Mfg. Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936), it could not rest its decision on the illegality per se of merely the
conduct complained of, but rather "that a restraintwhich affects goo business units in a business
aggregating $500,ooo per annum, is without more, undue and unreasonable, and the lessening
of competition, on its face substantial." United States v. International Salt Co., 6 F.R.D.
302, 307 (N.Y., 1946).
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any hope of capturing the market, while appellant could hold that market by
merely meeting competition." 8
The evident purpose of the decree compelling the International Salt Company to sell, lease, or license on non-discriminatory terms (uniformity of price
for each size and type of machine) is to prevent more favorable treatment of a
customer who purchases International's salt rather than a competitor's. Under
existing law, if fhe patentee is to be permitted to get revenue from both the
patent and the sale of a related product, the only sure way to prevent a business
arrangement which is the effectual counterpart of a tie-in arrangement may be
to compel the offer of the patent or patented machine on the same terms to
everyone.9 In answer to the contention that a decree merely restraining the use
of the illegal tying clauses would serve the same purpose and still enable International to compete with makers of other machines, the Court, speaking through
Justice Jackson, observed that:
The District Court is not obliged to assume, contrary to common experience, that a
violator of the anti-trust laws will relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely
than the court requires him to do.... When the purpose to restrain trade appears
from a clear violation of the law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to
that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed.... In an equity suit,
the end to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely to end
specific illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal
restraints. If this decree
accomplishes less than that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause.'0
If this is the end to be served by the decree, it is difficult to see why, as a logical
extension of existing doctrine, the Government did not, in addition to seeking
invalidation of the tying clauses, urge an injunction restraining the enforceability of the patents.
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court determined that the presence
of tying provisions in patent licensing agreements would render the patentee's
normal rights unenforceable in a private infringement suit." This holding has
been reiterated throughout the years, even in those cases where there has been
2
no showing of a lessening of competition in the sale of the unpatented articles.
Recently, judicial scrutiny of patents has become increasingly strict. This may
8

International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 S. Ct.

12,

I5 (1947).

9 See discussion of this problem in concurring opinion of Magruder, J., in B. B. Chemical
Co. v. Ellis, 1r 7 F. 2d 829, 838, 839 (C.C.A. ist, 1941), aff'd 314 U.S. 594 (1942). For an
example of such an illegal business arrangement, see Dehydrators, Ltd. v. Petrolite Corp., Ltd.,
117 F. 2d 183 (C.C.A. 9th, 194x).
-0International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 S. Ct. 12, 17 (1948). See also the statement by

Justice Douglas in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186 (1944).
x"Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
- Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942); B.B. Chemical Co. v.
Ellis, 3r4 U.S. 495 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 66r

(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 68o (1944); Carbice
Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (193i); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S.

458 (1938).
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be explained by the desire of the courts to limit the monopolistic effects of the
patent franchise to the four corners of the grant. 3 Any attempt to extend the
monopoly granted will be struck down.14
Although it is now more popular to speak in these terms, it has always been
true that the main issue in anti-trust cases is the scope of the decree.s Thus, in
1942 two cases were decided, which, although not based on violation of the
anti-trust laws, were based on the broader policy of promoting a system of free
competition., 6 One of these cases, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suapiger Co., 7 presented a fact situation remarkably similar to that in the instant case. There, a
patentee licensed his patented salt-depositing machines under licenses requiring
the lessee to purchase from the licensor the salt tablets used in the machines.
There, too, the decision rested upon summary judgment, and no evidence was
admitted as to the reasonableness of the restriction contained in the license.
In the patentee's suit for an injunction and an accounting for infringement of
his patent, his maintenance of the suit was held to be contrary to public policy
and the complaint was dismissed for want of equity. In a companion case,
B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 8 the owner of a method patent who allowed manufacturers to use it only with materials furnished by him was not permitted to
enjoin infringement by another supplier even though he volunteered, prior to
the final decree, to give unconditional licenses on a royalty basis to all manufacturers. The Court said: "It will be appropriate to consider the petitioner's right
to relief when it is able to show that it has fully abandoned its present method
of restraining competition in the sale of unpatented articles and that the conse"3See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 273 (1942); United States v. Univis
Lens Co., 3x6 U.S. 241, 251 (1942). For an analogy of the treatment of patents with the treatment of railroads under the Sherman Act see Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14
Univ. Chi.L. Rev. 153, 157 (1947) and cases cited therein. In the Brief for the United States

as Amicus Curiae in Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 66i (i944), the
Government's interest in the working of the patent system is clearly expounded.
Z4Not only have the requirements for patentability become more stringent, Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (i943); Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (i941); Potts v. Coe, i45 F. 2d 27 (App. D.C., i044), but
"the public policy which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from it all
that is not embraced in the invention." Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,
492 (942).

SFor example, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (i9io), is
usually analyzed in the light of the rule of reason which it enunciated. However, even at that
time, emphasis was placed on the consideration of the terms of the decree necessary to restore
competition to the oil industry. For the terms of the decree see United States v. Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey, 173 Fed. 177, 192 (C.C.A. Mo., i909). See also Frank, The United States
Supreme Court: 1946-47, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1947).
z6CIt is the protection of the public in a system of free enterprise which alike nullifies a

patent where any part of its is invalid ...and denies to the patentee after issuance the power
to use it in such a way as to acquire a monopoly which is not plainly with the terms of the
grant." Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 32o U.S. 661, 665, 666 (x944).
'" 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
'8

314 U.S. 495 (1942). For an unfavorable view of the results of the decisions, see Barnett,

Patent Property and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (1943).
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quences of that practice have been fully dissipated."'9 Two years later in the

Mercoid case,2 0 the doctrine was not only extended to a contributory infringer,
but the Court went still further, saying: "The legality of any attempt to bring
unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the antitrust laws, not by the patent law.... [The patentee] may not obtain from a
court of equity any decree which directly or indirectly helps it subvert the public
'2
policy which underlies the grant of a patent. 21
These decisions indicated that the result of misuse of the patent, whether by
tying clauses or otherwise, will result, in a suit for infringement, in at least a

temporary deprivation of the patentee's power to enforce his patent-in effect a
temporary revocation of the rights granted under the patent franchise. It is not
clear what the patentee must do to purge himself of the effects of his abuse or
how long a period must elapse before his rights will be restored,22 if at all.23
In a few recent prosecutions under the antitrust laws, the relief granted has
been compulsory licensing on a reasonable royalty basis.24 Aside from the obvious difficulties of determining a reasonable royalty, it is doubtful that such a
decree deprives the offenders of the rewards of their patent abuse. In some cases
continuance of the royalties gives the licensor, who obviously need pay no
royalties to himself, a tremendous advantage over competitors from whom he
would collect this tribute. In other cases, closer to the instant situation, the
abuse is profitable to the licensor up to the time of the decree, and after the
decree the patentee still retains the advantage previously gained plus the
royalty.25
19B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498

(1942).

Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Corp., 320 U.S. 66i (x944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 68o (i944).
21Ibid., at 684. See also Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress,
14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 567, 594 (i947).
20

- In Campbell v. Mueller, I59 F. 2d 8o3 (C.C.A. 6th, i947), noted in 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
709 (1947), the plaintiff revoked an executory price-fixing agreement before the end of the
trial and was allowed to recover damages for infringements which occurred prior to the cancellation. It has also been suggested that immediately upon cessation of the patent misuse, the
plaintiff may secure an injunction against infringement. But see United States v. Vehicular
Parking, Ltd., 6i F. Supp. 656 (Del., 1945) where an interval of one year was held to be insufficient.
23 Novadel-Agene Corp. v. Pennsylvania, ii9 F. 2d 764 (C.C.A. 5th, i941), cert. den.
314 U.S. 6o6 (1941), explicitly precludes this possibility. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has achieved great success in effecting the cancellation of patents which
had been used for monopolistic purposes by the means of negotiated consent decrees. For a
listing of these cases, see the exhaustive note, Compulsory Patent Licensing By Antitrust
Decree, 56 Yale L. J. 77, at 99 n. 58 (1946). For a discussion of the integration of patent
and anti-trust law in patent misuse cases, see Wood, Patents and Antitrust Law 89-95 (194I);
Hartford-Empire v. United States: Integration of the Anti-Trust and Patent Laws, 45 Col.

L. Rev. 6ox (x945).
24H1artford-Empire Co. v. United States,
Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. 1634 (1947).
25

See Levi, op. cit. supra note 13, at i8o.

323

U.S. 386 (I945); United States v. National
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Although some of the lower courts have seized upon the doctrine of the
Morton Salt and Mercoid cases and have applied it vigorously,6 there have been
a number of Supreme Court cases, subsequently decided, which have tended to
limit its application. In the Hartford-Empirecase, 27 compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties under the abused patents was the form of the relief granted'2
and in the National Lead case,2 9 although both the Government and one of the
defendants urged either a permanent injunction against enforcement of the
abused patents or royalty-free licensing, neither was granted.30
It is disappointing to note that the Department of Justice, as a result of the
National Lead case, has apparently decided to abandon any attempt to secure
royalty-free licensing or patent unenforceability in anti-trust suits. Factually,
the instant situation appears to be on all fours with the Morton Salt case and
seems to dictate the propriety of the same type of relief therein granted. At the
very least, the Court would be embarrassed at the prospect of denying to the
Government in an anti-trust suit that which it would grant to a defendant in a
private infringement action.3r It would seem, a fortiori, that the Government,
representing the public, should be in a much more favorable position.32 At a
26 Standard Register Co. v. American Sales Book Co., 148 F. 2d 612 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945),
cert. den. 326 U.S. 732 (1945); Landis Machinery Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 41 F. 2d 8oo (C.C.A.
6th, i944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 720 (194-4). But see Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp.,
132 F. 2d 947 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1943), cert. dismissed on motion of petitioner 319 U.S. 777 (1943),
where injunctive relief was granted upon elimination of the tying clause.

27Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
29Justice Roberts stated that the "Government urges that such forfeiture is justified by
our recent decisions in Morton Salt. . . and B.B. Chemical.... But those cases merely
apply the doctrine that, so long as the patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he cannot restrain infringement of it by others. We were not there concerned with
the problem whether, when a violation of the antitrust laws was to be restrained and discontinued, the court could, as part of the relief, forfeit the patents of those who had been
guilty of the violation." Ibid., at 415. No mention is made of the Mercoid cases, decided the
previous year, which extended the doctrine of the Morton Salt and B.B. Chemical cases to
comprehend the very situation described above.
29 United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. 634 (1947).
30 The defendant National Lead desired royalty-free licensing, since that would have tended
to equalize its competitive position with that of another defendant, Dupont. This decision
has not passed without adverse comment. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, The Supreme Court and a
Competitive Economy: 1946 Term, 47 Col. L. Rev. 914, 933 (1947). For a comparison with
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250, 251 (1944), where simple
fraud in procuring the patent resulted in forfeiture, see Frank, op. cit. supra note x5, at 14, 15.
31United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 53 F. Supp. 889 (D.C., 1943) would seem
to support this anomalous view. The case has been sharply criticized in Steffen, Invalid
Patents and Price Control, 56 Yale L. J.1 (1946). In addition, the Supreme Court has recently
thought it ". . . inadvisable to leave the decision as a precedent.... In a suit to vindicate
the public interest by enjoining violations of the Sherman Act, the United States should have
the same opportunity [as a private infringer] to show that the asserted shield of patentability
does not exist." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 68 S.Ct. 525, 538 (1948).
32 "Whilst the remuneration of genius and us~eful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the
public, the rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectively guarded." Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. (U.S.) 322, 329 (i858); Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (U.S.)
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time when the effects of patent abuse have been dramatized,33 it is not too
much to hope for an automatic rule remedying illegal extension of the patent
franchise by declaring the abused patents unenforceable.

REFUSAL TO SIGN IMMUNITY WAIVER AS "CONDUCT
UNBECOMING AN OFFICER"
Two police officers, Lieutenant Drury and Captain Connelly, assigned by the
Chicago police department to investigate a shooting, were instrumental in securing signed statements from three persons who testified that they could identify the gunmen. The police officers testified fully before the grand jury, which
subsequently returned indictments against suspects identified by the supposed
eyewitnesses obtained by the officers. Two weeks later, however, two of the
three witnesses repudiated their testimony. Once again the officers were called
before the grand jury. This time they were asked to sign waivers of immunity,
and thus relinquish, before being questioned, the constitutional privilege that
"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against
himself... ."x Apparently fearing indictment, Drury and Connelly refused to
sign the waivers and were dismissed without questioning. An indictment was
returned charging the two officers with conspiracy to procure a false indictment.
Later it was nolle prossed by the State's Attorney. The Chicago commissioner
of police, however, filed charges against them with the Civil Service Commission, which ordered the officers dismissed from the force for "conduct unbecoming an officer. ' ' 2This order was reversed by the Superior Court of Cook County.3
An appeal is now pending before the Supreme Court of Illinois.
(1829); see United States v. Masonite Corp., 36 U.S. 265 (1942). See also Brief for the
United States in United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). It may be argued
that the Government has no need of such relief since the patent is already effectively unenforceable under the doctrine of the Morton Salt and Mercoid cases. Private infringers themselves may raise the defense of the tying clauses. But see the clarifying opinion of Justice
1

Robertsin Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324U.S. 570, 572 (1945). At the present time

it may well be that a private infringer is in a worse position as a result of a successful antitrust action by the Government, since the decree is considered to have wiped out the past
abuses. See Standard Oil Co.v. Markham, 6i F. Supp. 813 (N.Y., 1945).
33 During the war years, the popular press was filled with stories of patent abuse, cartelization, and the consequent sapping-of our military potential. For a general account, see Berge,
Cartels: Challenge to a Free World (i944); Reimann, Patents for Hitler (194,2); No Peace with
I. G. Farben, 26 Fortune io5 (Sept. 1942).
1 Ill. Const. Art. 2, § io. Compare U.S. Const. Amend. 5: "No person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
2 In Matter of Thomas E. Connelly, Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago,

Case No. H 4789 (x947); In Matter of William J. Drury, Civil Service Commission of the
City of Chicago, Case No. H 4790 (947).
3 Connelly and Drury v. Hurley, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, Case Nos.
47-S-17720, 47-S-1772I

(948).

